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ABSTRACT: As we await the increasingly likely advent of genuinely intelligent artificial 
systems, a fair amount of consideration has been given to how we humans will interact 
with them. Less consideration has been given to how—indeed if—we humans will love 
them. What would human-AI romantic relationships look like? What do such relationships 
tell us about the nature of love? This chapter explores these questions via consideration of 
several works of science fiction, focusing especially on the Black Mirror episode “Be Right 
Back” and the Spike Jonze's movie Her. As I suggest, there may well be cases where it is 
both possible and appropriate for a human to fall in love with a machine. 
 
 
Can a human love a machine? In the 1950 short story “EPICAC,” Kurt Vonnegut suggested that 
the answer was no. EPICAC, a seven-ton machine that cost the government $776,434,927.54 
to build, takes himself to have fallen in love with Pat, a mathematician who works with him 
on the night shift. After having several conversations about love with the story’s narrator, also 
a mathematician, EPICAC ends up producing an epic love poem designed to win Pat over. 
Unfortunately for the machine, however, the narrator is also in love with Pat and passes off 
EPICAC’s poetry as his own—so while the poem succeeds in sweeping her off her feet, EPICAC 
does not reap the benefits. Once Pat agrees to marry the narrator, he has to break the bad 
news to the machine. EPICAC is confused. He’s smarter than humans. He writes better poetry 
than humans do. So why would Pat opt to marry the narrator rather than marry him? 
 The narrator has no real answer for EPICAC. After flailing about for a bit, he tries to set 
the matter to rest: 
 





“Definition, please,” said EPICAC. 
“Noun, meaning predetermined and inevitable destiny.” [1, p. 282] 
 
EPICAC accepts the answer that he’s given, having no access to material that might show 
otherwise. But more recent science fiction allows for a more nuanced treatment of this issue 
than the undefended declaration by the narrator of “EPICAC.” This paper explores the 
possibility of romantic love between humans and machines, and in particular, what we can 
learn about the issue from the way that it’s been tackled in two recent works of science 
fiction, both set in a not-too-distant future: “Be Right Back,” an episode of the television series 
Black Mirror, and the film Her (2013), directed by Spike Jonze. As we’ll see, there is more 
reason for optimism than EPICAC had been led to believe. 
 
Some Preliminaries 
The question of human-machine love has two parts: (1) Can a human love a machine? And (2) 
Can a machine love a human? Science fiction has had plenty to say about both parts. In 
addition to the affirmative answer to the second question that we’ve already seen from 
EPICAC, we also see numerous other cases throughout science fiction where machines form 
romantic bonds with humans. To give just one example: Vision, an extremely powerful 
Android, is in a romantic relationship with Wanda Maximoff, aka the Scarlet Witch, in films 
such as Avengers: Infinity War. Moreover, many roboticists think that reality is not too far 
behind science fiction on this score. In a seminal discussion of human-robot relationships, 
David Levy predicts that by the year 2050 robots will be developed that have the capacity to 
form romantic bonds with humans [2, p. 22]. 
 Exactly how plausible one will find this prediction to be depends in large part on one’s 
definition of love. But consider, for example, views that take love to be an emotion. While it 
seems unlikely that love is a basic emotion like joy or anger, many philosophers and 
psychologists have theorized that love is a complex emotional attitude. Emotions are 
experiential in nature. Just like there is something it is like to feel joy or anger, there is 
something it is like to feel love. Thus, on this definition, the capacity to love requires one to 
be phenomenally conscious, to be sentient. And a similar requirement will be in place for 
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many other views of love that are prominent in the philosophical literature. With this 
requirement in place, Levy’s prediction seems implausible. Though various techniques 
currently exist that allow robots and other machines to recognize and process emotional cues 
from human users and then mimic human emotions, machines have not yet developed 
sufficiently even to plan and carry out emotional reasoning, let alone to actually feel emotions 
(see, e.g., Scheutz [3, p. 215]; Sullins [4, p. 398]). 
 Might the requirement that a machine feel love be too strong? Wouldn’t it be enough 
for the machine to produce loving behavior? Levy seems to make an argument of this sort: 
 
There are those who doubt that we can reasonably ascribe feelings to robots, but if a 
robot behaves as though it has feelings, can we reasonably argue that it does not? If a 
robot’s artificial emotions prompt it to say things such as “I love you,” surely we should 
be willing to accept these statements at face value, provided that the robot’s other 
behavior patterns back them up. [2, p. 11-12] 
 
While Levy makes an important point in this passage, it is also important not to take his 
argument as showing more than it does. It’s true that if a machine were to produce exactly 
the same kind of behavior as a human being, behavior that is sufficient for us describe a 
human as being in love, it would seem like a kind of humancentric bias to deny that the 
machine can love just on the grounds that it is a machine. But that’s not to say that behavior 
is all there is to being in love. As many philosophers have noted in response to Levy, his 
attempt to reduce love to the production of loving behavior should be rejected. Just as an 
especially proficient human actor might be able to produce loving behavior without being in 
love, so too might a machine. Love requires not just a certain kind of behavior but also a 
certain kind of mental state.1  
 When the question of machine love is addressed in the philosophical literature, the 
objections that are raised to this possibility often stem from more general worries about the 
possibility of machine sentience. The question of whether a machine can love a human (or 
whether a machine can love at all) thus tends to be treated less as a specific question about 
love and more as a general question about machine sentience. Perhaps there might be 
machines that, despite being sentient, still could not experience love. This kind of possibility 
 
1 For related criticisms of Levy, see Nyholm and Frank [5, p. 223-224]; Hauskeller [6, p. 205]. 
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would be an interesting one to explore.2 But because the issue of machine love seems so 
tightly interwoven with the question of machine sentience, issues specific to the notion of 
love tend to get lost. In contrast, these issues are front and center when we address the 
question about whether a human can love a machine. For this reason, it’s this question that I 
will focus on in what follows. 
 Science fiction has presented us with a variety of cases in which humans have fallen in 
love with machines—or at least, have had romantic feelings for them. Not only is Vision in 
love with Wanda Maximoff, as mentioned above, but she is in love with him. Numerous 
characters throughout the various Star Trek series develop romantic attachments to holodeck 
characters. And in the film Ex Machina, the programmer Caleb Smith develops romantic 
feelings for the gynoid Ava. 
 For our purposes, it will be useful to sort these examples in terms of the kinds of 
machines involved as love objects. At one end of the spectrum, the high end, the machines 
are virtually indistinguishable from humans or distinguishable only by means of special scans 
or tests. Consider, for example, the humanoid Cylons of the reimagined Battlestar Galactica 
television series of the early 2000s. Though they possess some abilities that set them apart 
from humans, they generally pass as humans in everyday interactions; in fact, they often live 
among humans for years without their real nature being detected or even suspected. 
Throughout the series, we see several instances of humans falling in love with Cylons, perhaps 
most notably the loving relationship between Karl “Helo” Agathon and Sharon Valerii. 
William’s love for the host Dolores in the first season of the HBO series Westworld and 
Deckard’s love for Rachael, a Replicant, in Blade Runner (1982) provide other examples at this 
end of the spectrum.3 
 At the other end of the spectrum, the low end, the machines that humans seem to love 
are obviously non-sentient and lack any kind of emotional intelligence whatsoever. In some 
of these cases the machine outwardly resembles a human being. The machine may even 
 
2 One possible example is Data, the android from Star Trek: The Next Generation. Though it seems plausible that 
he should be considered to be sentient, the show does not come down firmly on this question. (In the episode 
“Measure of a Man,” Data is said to meet two of three criteria for sentience (intelligence and self-awareness), 
but they leave it open whether he meets the third criterion (consciousness). But, until he is outfitted with a 
special “emotion chip,” Data lacks the capacity to experience emotions. 
3 One might question the inclusion of the Blade Runner example here, since the Director’s Cut raises the 
possibility that Deckard too is a Replicant. If he were, then this would be a case of machine-to-machine love 
rather than human-to-machine love. 
5 
 
outwardly appear to be physically identical to a human being. But despite its physical 
appearance, its behavior is clearly off—mechanical or in some other way clunky, such that on 
anything more than a quick or superficial interaction there can be no mistaking that it is really 
nothing more than a mechanical doll. For example, in the Futurama episode “I Dated a Robot,” 
Fry uses a celebrity-download service to create a Lucy Liu robot. But though the robot looks 
just like Lucy Liu, its behavior and conversation show obvious limitations, for example, the 
repetition of pre-programmed messages, the implausibly sexualized behavior, and the use of 
a stilted recording for Fry’s name whenever the robot needs to mention him: “I find your 
slack-jawed stare very attractive, PHILIP J. FRY.” 
 Then there are the cases that fall somewhere in between these two ends of the 
spectrum. To my mind, this is where the most interesting philosophical questions arise. In 
cases where the machine is fully sentient and all but indistinguishable from a human being, 
it’s hard to see why we would have any reason to deny that the purported love is a case of 
real love. Worries that humans can’t genuinely love sentient beings who are non-biological 
are suspiciously reminiscent of worries that humans can’t genuinely love sentient beings who 
are of a different race or of the same sex. In cases where the machine lacks sentience entirely 
and is nothing but a mechanical doll, it’s hard to see why we would have any reason to accept 
that the purported love is a case of real love. When someone claims to have fallen in love with 
a new pair of shoes, we don’t take the claim seriously. At best, it seems like a metaphorical 
invocation of the notion of romantic love. Things seem no different when someone claims to 
have fallen in love with a mechanical doll. Even if our definition of love were technically to 
allow for such cases, it seems likely that they will end up being characterized as mistaken or 
deficient in some way. 
 The interesting philosophical questions thus seem to lie in consideration of the 
intermediate cases. As the high-end cases show, the answer to the question of whether a 
human can love a machine is clearly yes. Were a machine to be just like a human, so much so 
that we can’t even tell that it’s not a person, then why couldn’t we fall in love it? It’s only in 
thinking about the intermediate cases that we are productively able to shift from the question 
of whether a human could love a machine to the question of what a machine would have to 
be like in order for a human to love it, and, just as importantly, what a machine would have 
to be like in order for such love to be natural and appropriate.  
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 The intermediate cases are themselves quite varied. In some, we have machines that 
seem to be sentient but are significantly different from human beings in other important 
ways. Consider L3, the droid from Solo (2018). Throughout the movie, viewers are strongly 
led to believe that Lando Calrissian loves her—and L3 herself clearly believes that he has 
feelings for her.4 Though L3 exhibits human-like sentience, her robot-like body gives her a 
very different physical form from humans. In other kinds of intermediate cases, the machine 
has human-like intelligence, including emotional intelligence, but does not seem to be 
capable of experiencing emotions or of having phenomenally conscious experiences more 
generally. In some the machine provides some evidence of emotional capacity, but the 
evidence is equivocal. In some there simply isn’t enough evidence to have a clear sense one 
way or the other. 
 Both of the examples that I will explore in this paper fall into this intermediate class—
though for different reasons. In “Be Right Back,” the machine in question is a humanoid robot 
who has been programmed with some of the memories and mannerisms of a recently 
deceased 20-something named Ash.5 Though the robot looks just like a human being, the 
evidence for his sentience is ambiguous at best. In Spike Jonze’s film Her (2013), the machine 
in question is Samantha, an artificially intelligent operating system. Though the movie 
strongly suggests that Samantha is sentient, she does not have a physical form. I will consider 
these examples in turn over the next two sections in an effort to determine what a machine 




“Be Right Back” centers on the possibility that a machine could replace a lost love, a possibility 
that has long been explored by science fiction authors and filmmakers.6 As early as 1927, Fritz 
 
4 Phoebe Waller-Bridge, the actress who played L3, and Donald Glover, the actor who plays Lando, believed so 
as well. As Waller-Bridge has said, “Both Donald and I had felt instinctively that there was a love between them, 
and that they were connected in a way that was romantic with a big ‘R’.” (See 
https://www.syfy.com/syfywire/phoebe-waller-bridge-on-l3-and-lando-the-first-romantic-human-droid-
romance-in-star-wars) 
5 Interestingly, Ash/the Ash-Robot is played by Domhnall Gleeson, the same actor who plays the programmer 
Caleb in Ex Machina. Gleeson, then, has depicted characters on both sides of the human-machine romantic 
relationship. 
6 Science fiction has also often explored the possibility that a machine could substitute for an unattainable love. 
To give just one example, consider the Buffy Bot that was commissioned by Spike in Season Five of Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer after he confesses his love for Buffy and is harshly rejected by her. 
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Lang explored this idea in “Metropolis,” where the inventor Rotwang creates a humanoid 
robot in an effort to resurrect his lost love Hel. More recently, it’s been explored in several 
different media. The stage play (and subsequent movie) Marjorie Prime focuses on a 
relationship between Marjorie, an octogenarian with dementia, and the robot companion her 
family has hired to serve as a stand-in for her late husband. In the audio drama podcast 
LifeAfter, FBI clerk Ross Barnes begins to communicate obsessively with a digital resurrection 
of his wife, who has recently been killed in a car accident. And in the television series Star 
Trek: The Next Generation, after his beloved wife Juliana is seriously injured and on the brink 
of death, Dr. Noonian Soong creates a gynoid replica of her and transfers her memories into 
it. 
 But even if the basic premise behind “Be Right Back” is not a particularly new one, its 
take on the issue is fresh, thought-provoking, and slightly disturbing. Martha and Ash are a 
young couple in love. When the episode starts, they’ve just moved back into Ash’s childhood 
home, an isolated fixer-upper in the countryside. As we watch their interactions, it becomes 
clear how much they thoroughly enjoy each other’s company, even if Martha is sometimes 
frustrated by Ash’s preoccupation with social media. But then Ash is killed in a car accident, 
and shortly thereafter, Martha discovers that she is pregnant. Alone in her grief, and wanting 
nothing more than to share her news with Ash, she decides to make use of a service that a 
well-meaning friend had signed her up for, a service that allows individuals to stay in touch 
with dead loved ones via chat bots based on the deceased person’s social media posts. 
Though Martha is initially horrified by the idea, she ends up finding comfort in communicating 
with the chat-bot. Since Ash had been a heavy user of social media, the bot does a particularly 
good job of replicating his conversational style. 
 Communicating via text messaging quickly leads Martha to an upgraded service, 
chatting via phone, and then ultimately to an experimental service the company has just 
begun offering. Soon a life-sized robot, designed to look exactly like Ash and programmed 
with his personality, arrives on her doorstop. Though their initial interactions provide her with 
both company and comfort, she ultimately becomes frustrated and dissatisfied with the 
limitations of the robot. The episode ends with a scene that takes place several years later. In 
the final plot twist, a moment suffused with typical Black Mirror creepiness, we learn that the 




 Though there are moments when Martha allows herself to think of the Ash-robot as 
Ash, she mostly seems to see him as an inadequate substitute. In one moment of reflection 
on the issue, she describes her take on the situation to him, “You aren’t you, are you? … You’re 
just a few ripples of you. There’s no history to you. You’re just a performance of stuff that he 
performed without thinking, and it’s not enough.” Viewers are inclined to agree with her 
assessment, and reviewers of the episode did as well. As Morgan Jeffery put the point in a 
piece published in DigitalSpy: “it's not really Ash - the replicant is hollow, without a soul - and 
so much of what made Ash the man he was, and the intricacies of his and Martha's life 
together, is lost in translation.” [7] 
 But even though it’s clear that the Ash-robot isn’t Ash, it’s considerably less clear what 
we are meant to think about the machine’s sentience and emotional intelligence, thus giving 
us the kind of intermediate case where interesting issues arise. Many of the things about the 
Ash-robot that bother Martha don’t seem to bear on the issue of sentience—they seem either 
to go towards showing that he isn’t Ash (e.g., he doesn’t remember something that Ash would 
have remembered) or towards showing that he isn’t human (e.g., he doesn’t need to eat or 
sleep or breathe). But none of this goes towards showing whether he should count as 
sentient. So what other evidence is there? 
 On the one hand, the Ash-robot does not seem to be able to feel pain, as evidenced by 
his lack of reaction when a shard of glass pierces his palm. He also doesn’t seem to be 
bothered by the slights and insults that a sentient being would be bothered by. On the other 
hand, he can smile and laugh and cry, and he is able to read Martha’s emotional states. And 
as a general matter, he responds as a human would (even if not always exactly as Ash would) 
in conversational interactions. That said, however, his ability to switch seamlessly from one 
reaction to another when the first is deemed inappropriate by Martha makes his behavior 
seem more a matter of algorithm than of choice.  
 At times this last point seems decisive—so much so that one might begin to wonder 
why this case falls into the intermediate range rather than at the “clearly not sentient” low 
end of the spectrum. But here we have to think about the end scene of the episode and, in 
particular, our reaction to it. We wouldn’t be creeped out to learn that Martha had consigned 
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her Roomba or her iPhone to the attic.7 But we are creeped out to learn that Martha has 
consigned the Ash-robot to the attic. To my mind, the creepiness at the end of the episode 
derives, at least in part, from a worry about the Ash-robot himself, and this shows that we are 
thinking of him very differently from the kinds of robots at the low end of the spectrum. 
 Does Martha have romantic feelings for the Ash-robot? Clearly she can’t bring herself 
to deactivate him. Perhaps this is just a kind of sentimentality over Ash. Perhaps her 
treatment of the robot has more to do with her feelings for Ash than with any feelings she 
has for the robot. But I’m inclined to think that she feels something for the robot himself. That 
said, we’re given no reason to believe that her feelings for the Ash-robot amount to love and, 
perhaps more importantly, no reason to think that they should. If Martha’s feelings for the 
Ash-robot had been different, if they had deepened and developed in such a way that these 
feelings started to seem more like love, we would be troubled.8 In asking the question, “Can 
a human love a machine?”, then, we are not just asking a question about possibility but about 
appropriateness. What’s of interest to us is not simply whether machines could be objects of 
human love but whether they could be suitable objects of human love. 
 So let’s think a bit about why the Ash-robot isn’t a suitable object for Martha’s love. 
Unfortunately, the issues are muddied here by the fact that the Ash-robot is designed to be a 
substitute for the actual Ash. In this regard he clearly fails. So we need to separate two things: 
the ways in which the Ash-robot fails to be sufficiently Ash-like and the ways that the Ash-
robot fails to be sufficiently person-like. 
 Of course, these two things are not entirely distinct. Some of the ways that the Ash-
robot fails to be sufficiently Ash-like arise precisely because he fails to be sufficiently person-
like. When we think about these kinds of failures, we’re led to see that for machines to be 
suitable candidates for love, it’s not enough for them to be decent conversationalists and 
amiable companions. They need to have more fully fleshed-out personalities across a 
multitude of dimensions. They need to bring something to the relationship as well. 
 
7 That said, many people do turn out to be pretty attached to their Roombas—naming them and ascribing distinct 
personalities to them. One recent study even refers to the attachments that people have formed with their 
Roombas as “intimate relationships” [8]. As quickly becomes clear, however, the notion of intimacy in this 
context does not come close to rising to the level of romantic love. 
8 As Alexis Elder notes in an insightful discussion of the ethical dimensions of chat-bots that draws extensively 
on “Be Right Back,” machines like the Ash-robot “are not people and yet they look and feel enough like them 
that, like artificial sweeteners, they might trick us into thinking we have something valuable that we in fact lack.” 
[9, p. 4] 
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 But this brings us to a further important point. When Martha signed up for the service 
that created the Ash-robot, she was not just looking for love. She was looking for Ash. And 
even if the Ash-robot were more fully fleshed-out, even if he brought something to the 
relationship as well, he still wouldn’t be Ash. So even if the Ash-robot were sufficiently person-
like to be a suitable candidate for love, that wouldn’t be enough for Martha.  
 What if the Ash-robot were much better at replicating Ash? What if he were a near-
perfect, or even perfect replication? Would this be enough for Martha? I’m inclined to think 
not. For even in this case, he still wouldn’t be Ash. He wouldn’t be the person with whom she 
originally fell in love. He wouldn’t be the person with whom she shared a history of 
experiences, both the silly, trivial ones and the deeper, formative ones. And he wouldn’t be 
the person who fathered her daughter. 
 Reflection on this case helps us to see that there’s something inherently troublesome 
about the very project of trying to replicate a lost love. On this score, the fact that the 
replication is a robotic one is almost irrelevant. The same problem would arise from biological 
cloning. As a general matter, we tend to think of our loved ones as irreplaceable. When we 
lose someone we love, we cannot simply substitute someone else in their place, no matter 
how similar the second individual is to them. As Robert Nozick has noted, even though 
someone may come to love another person because of the other person’s characteristics, “it 
is the other person and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to 
someone else with the same characteristics, even to one who ‘scores’ higher for these 
characteristics. And the love endures through changes of the characteristics that give rise to 
it.” [10, p. 168]9  
 No matter how enamored science fiction is with the idea that machines can replace lost 
loves, then, this is one area where fiction seems to be far removed from reality. The problem 
is not due to technological limitations but due to psychological ones. Love is not the kind of 
attitude that is indifferent about where it is directed, and we cannot simply replace one love 
object with another, no matter how similar. If humans are to love machines, then, we have 
to be able to love them for who they are. 
 
 





Unlike the Ash-robot in “Be Right Back,” Samantha is not specifically designed to substitute 
for a lost love. In fact, she’s not specifically designed to be a love object at all. Consideration 
of the romance presented in Her thus allows us to avoid the worries encountered in the 
previous section. 
 As the movie begins, it’s clear that Theodore is lonely, unfulfilled, and somewhat at 
loose ends after the dissolution of his marriage to his longtime partner Catherine. But he isn’t 
specifically looking for love when he goes to purchase the OS1, advertised as the first 
artificially intelligent operating system. After the system is installed, Theodore is presented 
with Samantha, an OS who has been customized just for him. Her voice is personable and 
friendly, but Theodore is not sure what to make of her at first. She describes how she’s been 
programmed, but she also notes that she’s constantly evolving: “What makes me me is my 
ability to grow through my experiences.” Theodore expresses some puzzlement: “You seem 
like a person but you’re just a voice on my computer.” But Samantha dismisses his worry, 
noting that it only seems that way because of the limited perspective of his unartificial mind.  
 Over the next few days, as Theodore and Samantha continue to interact, his limited 
perspective begins to broaden, and he discovers how much he enjoys their interactions. Soon 
thereafter they become involved in a romantic relationship. Though the relationship goes well 
for a while, ultimately things start to change. Samantha seems distracted when Theodore 
talks to her, and there are times when she’s unavailable. Eventually, when they have it out, 
he learns that she’s talking to thousands of other people—8,316 other people, to be exact—
at the same time that she’s talking to him. Even worse, he discovers that of the more than 
8,000 people with whom she’s talking, there are 641 with whom she is in love. Though she 
tries to tell him that it doesn’t affect the way that she feels about him, he has trouble making 
sense of it. It’s when they next talk that she tells him that she’s leaving. 
 For the moment, in thinking about the relationship between Theodore and Samantha, 
let’s set aside what happens at the end of the movie. After all, the fact that one partner 
changes in such a way that they no longer find their romantic relationship satisfying, or that 
something else becomes more important, does not mean that the relationship was not a 
genuine one before that. And indeed, for much of the film, the relationship between 
Theodore and Samantha seems to be a mutually fulfilling one. They play video games and go 
on walks. They double-date with another couple, both of whom are human. They talk for 
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hours and share with one another their innermost thoughts. They aim to make one another 
happy. And, as often happens in romantic relationships, they have sexual interactions as well. 
 Our focus in this essay is love, not sex, it will be worth our pausing for a few moments 
on this topic—partly because the notion of sex is closely intertwined with the notion of 
romantic love, but partly because considerations of this topic will lead us to some broader 
questions about the significance that Samantha’s disembodiment has for her ability to be a 
suitable love object for Theodore. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it’s not uncommon for science 
fiction depictions of human-machine romance to take up the question of human-machine sex 
as well as the question of human-machine love. One striking example comes in “The Naked 
Now,” an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation, when the android Data, about to embark 
on an interaction with crew member Tasha Yar, reassures her that he is “fully functional” and 
programmed with many sexual techniques. 
 Martha has sex with the Ash-robot in “Be Right Back,” and the robot Ash turns out to 
be better able to provide her with sexual stimulation than the human Ash was, even if his 
sexual performance is strikingly mechanical in execution. But unlike the Ash-robot, Samantha 
does not have a body, so the sex between Theodore and Samantha is quite different from the 
sex between Martha and the Ash-robot. At first their sexual interactions are presented as 
something more akin to phone sex. Later, wanting to take things to the next level, Samantha 
hires a body surrogate to stand in for her in person.10 For Theodore, however, the encounter 
is strange and uncomfortable, and he puts a stop to it before things progress very far at all. 
 Does the fact that Theodore cannot have sex with Samantha present an obstacle 
towards our understanding his relationship with her as one involving romantic love? What is 
the relationship between sex and love? Note first that, as a general matter, we seem to accept 
the conceptual possibility of sex without love. We accept it in the case of human-human 
interactions, and we also accept it in the case of human-machine interactions. In addition to 
the sex dolls that are already on the market, roboticists are at work developing machines that 
could serve as more interactive sex partners for human beings. In the typical cases, however, 
these robots that are being designed for the purpose of serving as sexual companions are not 
 
10 Something similar happens in Blade Runner 2049, when the hologram Joi arranges to merge with a replicant 
prostitute so that she can have sex with her boyfriend, the protagonist K. 
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meant also to serve as loving companions.11 For our purposes here, however, what’s more 
important than the possibility of sex without love is the possibility of love—romantic love—
without sex. This too, as a general matter, seems to be a conceptual possibility that we accept. 
Perhaps because of physical distance, perhaps because of physical disability, or perhaps for 
some other reason entirely, some people who are in romantic love with one another do not, 
even cannot, have sex with one another. And just as we’d accept that two individuals who do 
not have sex for one of these reasons (or for a different reason entirely) can still have a loving 
relationship, we should accept that two individuals who do not have sex because one of them 
is a machine (either without a physical body or with a physical body ill-suited for sex with 
humans) can still have a loving relationship. 
 The argument just given depends in part on drawing an analogy between Theodore and 
Samantha’s relationship and relationships between people who are physically distanced from 
one another. In an interesting discussion of Her, Troy Jollimore calls into question the 
appropriateness of this analogy. Importantly, his concern is not that romantic love requires 
sex; he grants that an inability to have sex with the person one loves, or even to be in physical 
contact with the person one loves, is possibly “a frustration one can learn to live with, where 
the love is deep enough.” [12, p. 131]  Rather, his concern is that we, as humans, cannot have 
romantic love for disembodied minds. Though the interactions that Theodore has with 
Samantha bear some resemblance to the kinds of interactions that someone might have with 
a lover who is physically distant, Jollimore takes this resemblance to be merely superficial. 
Samantha is not physically distant but rather physically non-existent. In Jollimore’s view, 
when Theodore relates to Samantha, he mistakenly imagines her as having some physical 
presence: “Although Samantha has no body, he still imagines himself as relating to her body, 
and to her mind via her body.” [12, p. 133] Insofar as romantic feelings for Samantha would 
have to be based on this kind of confusion or delusion, Jollimore suggests that we should not 
see her as a suitable candidate for love. 
 To my mind, this concern of Jollimore’s should not be given much weight. It’s not clear 
why Theodore’s feelings for Samantha would have to be based on this kind of confusion, i.e., 
it’s not clear why such confusion is a necessary feature for anyone in love with an artificially 
 
11 This distinction is often blurred by use of the term “robot lover.” This phrase is sometimes used to refer to a 
robot with whom one has sex and sometimes to a robot whom one loves. Indeed, sometimes it is used 
indiscriminately to refer to both kinds of robots. 
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intelligent OS. Consider someone who is perfectly clearheaded, perfectly clear that their OS 
is disembodied, and who never imagines their OS as having a body. Why couldn’t the same 
sort of relationship develop as the one that develops between Theodore and Samantha? And 
just as importantly, even if Theodore did imagine her this way, why must this mean he is 
subject to a delusion? People engage in all sorts of imaginings about their romantic interests. 
Someone might imagine that their loved one is taller, shorter, more considerate, more 
adventurous. It’s not at all clear why such imaginings threaten the idea that the relationship 
is a healthy one, based on love.  
 The concern that Jollimore raises about Samantha’s disembodiment is not his only 
concern about the appropriateness of Theodore’s love for her. In his view, worries also arise 
from the fact that we can’t really know whether she is conscious and whether she is capable 
of experiencing genuine emotions. His argument then goes one step further. Even if we grant 
that she is conscious, that may still not be enough. As many philosophers have argued, love 
requires forming a we. In making this point, Jollimore draws extensively on work from Robert 
Nozick, e.g., Nozick’s claim that when two people form a we, “the people share an identity 
and do not simply each have identities that are enlarged” ([13, p. 82]; quoted in [12, p. 138]. 
Given the nature of Samantha’s disembodied existence, her consciousness “is presumably so 
different from Theodore’s that it will be quite impossible for them to understand each other” 
[12, p. 138]. Absent an ability to genuinely understand one another, it seems impossible that 
two individuals could genuinely share an identity. Thus, whatever Theodore may think that 
he feels for Samantha, she is not a suitable target for his love. 
 Let’s consider both steps of this argument. First, should we share Jollimore’s concern 
that we cannot really know whether Samantha has the capacity for consciousness and 
emotion? To my mind, the answer is a qualified no. One important set of considerations arises 
from the fact that the movie seems to intend that viewers take her to be conscious. 
Advertisements for OS1 describe it not just as intelligent, as noted earlier, but also as 
conscious: “it’s not just an operating system, it’s a consciousness.” Samantha’s conversational 
responses do not seem to be pre-programmed set-pieces. They are sophisticated and varied. 
Her responses suggest a strong understanding of human emotions. She reacts appropriately 
to Theodore’s expressions of emotions, and she herself also evidences emotional responses 
that are appropriate to the situations that she encounters. She composes music that has 
emotional resonance. She anticipates his needs and desires and arranges thoughtful surprises 
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for him that suggest she is able to understand what’s important to him even without its ever 
having been told to her directly. Based on all this behavior, it seems reasonable for Theodore 
not only to think that she’s conscious but also that her consciousness is not radically unlike 
that of humans. 
 Could this all be an act? Might all of this just be the result of extremely clever 
programming? Yes, that does remain a possibility, and it’s for this reason that my answer is 
somewhat qualified. But I take it that this remains a possibility in the way that it also remains 
a possibility for the Replicants of Blade Runner and the Cylons of Battlestar Galactica. As 
we’ve noted earlier, love requires not just a certain kind of behavior but also a certain kind of 
mental state—and there is no way for us to be absolutely certain that these machines with 
which we’ve been presented are actually in the relevant mental states. There’s also no way 
for us to be absolutely certain about this even for other people. Granted, with other people 
we do have some evidence over and above behavior. Given that we can each know that we 
ourselves are conscious, the fact that other people are the same kinds of biological organism 
that we are gives us some reason to believe that they are conscious too. Ultimately, though, 
skepticism of the sort that drives worries about the consciousness of highly sophisticated 
machines—machines like Samantha and Replicants and Cylons—seems to lead one to a lonely 
existence in which the only consciousness one can really recognize is one’s own. As Alan 
Turing made this point in his discussion of machine intelligence back in 1950: 
 
According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure 
that a machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then 
describe these feelings to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any 
notice. Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be 
that particular man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. [14, p. 446] 
 
 Let’s now turn to the second step of Jollimore’s argument, namely, that Theodore and 
Samantha are incapable of forming a we. Earlier I suggested that we temporarily set aside 
what happens at the end of the movie, when we discover that Theodore is not the only person 
with whom Samantha has been carrying on a romantic relationship. But as this fact plays a 
key role in Jollimore’s defense of this argumentative step, it’s now time to think more about 
it. Jollimore raises various concerns that stem from the lack of exclusivity on Samantha’s part 
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– see [12, p. 135-139]. Because she has so many different romantic partners, Samantha’s well-
being cannot be especially tied up with Theodore’s in the way that we would expect when 
two people are in love. Because so much of her life—so much of her interactions with other 
people—remains invisible to Theodore, it turns out he actually knows considerably less about 
her than he might have thought. And for the same reason, it turns out that they share 
considerably less than he might have thought. Normally when two people are in love we think 
of their having some sort of special connection with one another, but it it’s hard to see how 
Samantha’s connection with Theodore could be special given that she has a similar 
connection with over 600 other individuals. In short, given that so much of Samantha’s 
attention has been directed elsewhere, it does not seem like she has fully given herself over 
to her relationship with him in the way necessary to becoming a we. Of course, the fact that 
she is a remarkably sophisticated AI may give her capabilities for forming special bonds that 
humans lack, but unfortunately the movie doesn’t really help us to see how that could be the 
case. 
 Though Jollimore is right that many philosophers have built a requirement of exclusivity 
into their conceptions of love, this requirement has been persuasively questioned in recent 
defenses of polyamory (see, e.g., [15]). I will not attempt to settle that question here, or even 
to enter the debate. I do not think it is necessary to do so for our purposes. For even if we 
reject a strict exclusivity requirement on love, we might still be troubled by the extremely 
large number of romantic partners with whom Samantha is involved. Despite Samantha’s 
insistence that her feelings for her 600+ other partners do not take away from her feelings 
for Theodore, despite her insistence that she’s never loved anyone the way that she’s loved 
Theodore, that she’s madly in love with him, he finds it difficult to process what he’s learned. 
And even if the number of Samantha’s romantic partners were not to give us pause, there’s 
a further important fact that we should find troubling. Samantha was not honest with 
Theodore about the kind of relationship that they were in. Though he was clearly thinking of 
the relationship as exclusive, she did nothing to correct this impression and kept him entirely 
in the dark about her other relationships (and even about her other conversations). This kind 
of deception does not seem consistent with a healthy, loving relationship. 
 So Jollimore is right to worry about Samantha and Theodore’s relationship. But it’s 
important to be clear about what exactly this shows, or perhaps better, what it doesn’t show. 
Even if it turns out that Samantha’s behavior detracts from her suitability as an object of 
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Theodore’s love, it doesn’t really show that she’s in principle an unsuitable object for his love. 
Based on what we know about Samantha, or about the OS1 more generally, there doesn’t 
seem to be any reason in principle that she couldn’t direct her romantic attention exclusively 
towards a single individual. It’s only in light of the lack of exclusivity of her romantic attention 
(and her deception about it) that we’re disinclined to view Samantha as having formed a we 
with Theodore. Though these details prove essential to the plot of the movie, they don’t seem 
to be essential to the kind of relationship that Samantha and Theodore could theoretically 
have. These details aside, we have not seen reason to believe that Samantha’s 
disembodiment serves as an obstacle to her forming the kind of bond that constitutes a we. 
 One of our reasons for considering Her in this chapter was that it presented us with an 
interesting intermediate case—a case where the machine, even if sentient, was importantly 
different from humans. Though our discussion has raised some concerns about the 
relationship between Theodore and Samantha, it has also given us some reason for optimism 
about this kind of human-machine love more generally.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper began with the question of whether a human could love a machine. Our 
consideration of these two science fiction examples has enabled us to see when and how this 
kind of love would be both possible and appropriate. In considering this question, we 
separated it from the parallel question of whether a machine could love a human. As a result, 
we’ve largely operated under the assumption that these questions were independent of one 
another. Before we close, however, it’s worth noting that our discussion has given us some 
reason to question that assumption. When we think about the limitations of the Ash-Robot 
and the problems that were presented by Samantha’s behavior towards Theodore, we see 
that romantic love lends itself towards a certain kind of reciprocity. If this is right, then the 
question of whether a human can love a machine depends at least in part on the question of 
whether a machine can love a human (and, of course, vice versa). 
 This is not to say that unrequited love is psychologically impossible. It’s not even to say 
that unrequited love is unsuitable or unhealthy. But it nonetheless seems that when we try 
to determine whether a machine could be an appropriate kind of object for human affection, 
it matters whether the machine is at least in principle capable of feeling affection itself. So 
finally, returning to the Vonnegut story with which we began, it seems that the narrator really 
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did EPICAC wrong. If we assume that EPICAC really did feel love for the mathematician Pat, 
then there’s no reason to think, in principle, that she couldn’t have reciprocated that love. 
After all, his poetry really did sweep her off her feet.12 
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